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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of institutions on the unemployment gap between immigrants and 
natives in 11 EU-countries. We study whether benefits provide disincentive effects as the job-search 
theory suggests or rather efficiency gains as alternative theories propose. Further than the existing 
literature, we study unemployment duration instead of unemployment incidence, we distinguish 
between exits to inactivity, primary and secondary employment and we use individual-level measures 
for unemployment benefits. We apply a competing-risk event-history model using the ECHP. Our 
results favour the efficiency-gains argument for granting immigrants benefits as we find that benefits 
reduce unemployment duration and prevent transitions into inactivity. Employment perspectives of 
immigrants are better when demand for low-skilled labour is high, employment protection is low and 
immigration policy is labour-market oriented.  
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 1. Introduction 
Increasing immigration is a challenge faced by most EU countries. In most countries, however, labour 
market integration of immigrants is rather poor. Unemployment is a crucial indicator of this poor 
labour market integration. Unemployment rates among immigrants is much higher than for natives in 
most European countries (Berthoud 2000; Cheung and Heath 2007; OECDc). The large 
unemployment gap has caused great political and public concern as it is assumed to challenge social 
cohesion as well as undermine the sustainability of welfare states (Zimmermann 1995; OECDb). In 
some countries, immigrants have been accused of moral hazard, i.e. overusing unemployment benefits 
or social assistance.  
However, the size of the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives differs 
considerably between European countries. In Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries, the 
unemployment rates of immigrants and natives are almost equal. In contrast, in Scandinavia, 
unemployment rates of immigrants almost double unemployment rates of natives (OECDc). These 
differences have been interpreted as an effect of institutional differences and more specifically as a 
reflection of benefit generosity (Jensen 2006; Holm 2007). This perception not only thrives in the 
public opinion, but is also present in several research reports (see, e.g. Velfærdskommissionen). 
Despite these interesting cross-country differences, only a few comparative studies have been 
conducted in a European context (notable examples are Kogan 2007; 2006; 2003; Kesler 2006; Cohen 
and Kogan 2007; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007). 
Previous European studies are not only relatively scarce, but they have typically focussed on 
only one indicator of labour market integration, namely on cross-country differences in 
unemployment rates or unemployment incidence. However, for policy-makers that aim at securing 
long-term labour market integration of immigrants, it is important to know what determines the 
differences between immigrants and natives in the transitions out of unemployment.  Moreover, 
besides studying whether the chances of finding a job differs between unemployed immigrants and 
natives, it is particularly pertinent to investigate whether unemployed immigrants and natives differ in 
 the quality of job that they manage to find.
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 Inferior labour market integration may apply more to the 
quality of the job that immigrants are able to find than to the aggregate job-finding probability (Kogan 
2007). Exits from unemployment to inactivity are relevant as well. The ‘discouraged worker’ problem 
(Borjas 2005) may also be relevant for immigrant-native differences.  
A final issue is that most previous studies have relied on macro-level indicators of institutions. 
For example, the effect of economic incentives to leave unemployment is typically measured by the 
inclusion of welfare regime dummy variables (see e.g. Kogan 2006). Such proxies are often not very 
valid measures of institutions as they may capture the effect of several other cross-country differences 
(such as differences in wage structure and cultural practises, to mention just a few examples). 
Therefore, further research – which takes these shortcomings into account – is needed in order to 
establish whether there indeed exists a causal link between institutions and the labour market 
integration of immigrants. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of institutions – unemployment-related 
benefits, immigration policy, employment protection legislation and the size of the low-skilled labour 
force – on the unemployment-duration gap between immigrants and natives in 11 European countries. 
Our analysis extends the existing literature in three ways: Firstly, we investigate institutional effects 
on the unemployment-duration gap between immigrants and natives as opposed to incidence of 
unemployment that has been the typically-used independent variable. Secondly, we distinguish 
between transitions into inactivity, the primary and secondary labour market. Thirdly, we also 
introduce institutional measures for unemployment-related benefits at the individual level rather than 
merely using aggregate proxies. The method we apply is a competing risk event-history model using 
monthly data from ECHP and covering the period 1994-2001. Taking this approach, we improve our 
ability to make causal inferences about how institutions affect the unemployment gap between natives 
and immigrants.   
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical 
framework guiding the present paper and the previous empirical findings in the field. Data and 
 methodology are explained in section 3. The empirical findings are presented in section 4. This 
section presents first some descriptive figures on the relationship between the duration gap and the 
four main institutional variables and afterwards the results from the competing-risks event-history 
model. The conclusions in section 5 are accompanied by some recommendations for further research 
and policy. 
2. Institutions and unemployment of immigrants 
Welfare state and labour market institutions are assumed to prevent the conflicting desires of 
employers and workers from ‘balancing out’ and finding the equilibrium (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
This argument is often used in the discussion about the differences in unemployment rate between the 
US and Europe (Blau and Kahn 1996). It is often claimed that the relative higher rates and longer 
duration of unemployment especially in continental Europe compared to the US are caused by 
institutions such as strict employment protection and high levels of unemployment benefits. Our 
conviction, however, is that some institutions constitute employment barriers particularly for 
immigrant and hence cause differences in the duration of unemployment between immigrants and 
natives. This is also in accordance with the cross national variation in the unemployment gap between 
immigrants and natives (OECDc). Following the literature; we consider that the most important 
institutions affecting the gap in unemployment duration between immigrants and natives are 
unemployment-related benefits, employment structure particularly with respect to the size of the 
secondary labour market, employment protection legislation and the strictness and focus of the 
immigration policy. 
Unemployment benefits: disincentives or efficiency gains? 
According to the job-search theory (Mortensen 1986), unemployment benefits inevitably create 
disincentives for employment as they increase the reservation wage
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 of job seekers. These 
disincentives are larger for job seekers at the bottom of the income distribution as the level of benefits 
is closer to the reservation wage of these workers especially in countries with flat-rate benefits
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(Borjas 2005). Disincentive effects may therefore be more pronounced for immigrants as they tend to 
 be employed in low-wage occupations (Elliot and Lindley 2007). Moreover, even controlling for 
previous wage, unemployed immigrants who receive generous benefits may stay longer in 
unemployment if they have a lower ‘taste for work’ than natives (Borjas 2005) as often assumed by 
politicians and the general public.
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 The economic job search theory implicitly assumes that the behaviour of individual is only 
driven by financial considerations. However, non-financial employment motivation may be relevant 
here, as well (Nordenmark 1999). More specifically, we argue that benefits may act as a stepping 
stone for the unemployed and hence disincentive effects of benefits may therefore be offset by 
efficiency gains (Sinn 1995; Sinn 1996; Headey and Muffels 2008; Tatsiramos 2009). Unemployment 
benefits provide financial resources, enabling job seekers to take risks. Therefore, unemployment 
benefits will indirectly encourage job seekers to make long-term investments and not only worry 
about short-term economic gains. There are two positive mechanisms working in this direction. 
Firstly, the provision of unemployment benefits during education or training removes cash constraints 
from human capital investments. This is particularly important for immigrants as they tend to have 
lower country-specific human capital and/or suffer from the lack of recognition of educational 
credentials acquired in their country of origin. Secondly, benefits may enable the unemployed to 
sustain longer job search and hence find a job in line with their skills. Considering immigrants, access 
to benefits may be even more beneficial for the quality of their job match, as it may take more effort 
for them to get a job in line with their educational attainment. Except for financial resources, 
unemployment benefits may also influence the personal resources of the unemployed. Access to 
benefits during unemployment may prevent marginalisation (Goul Andersen 2007) and hence 
influence the well-being and the attitudes of the unemployed which is crucial for a successful job 
search. Finally, we may expect that the job-seeker who receives benefits during unemployment may 
be less likely to make transitions into inactivity (see, e.g. Addison and Portugal 2003) due to the 
increase in both financial and personal resources. Therefore, the labour supply of immigrants may be 
affected positively by the access to unemployment-related benefits. From this line of reasoning, we 
expect that the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits to be offset by efficiency gains.   
 Labour market institutions 
Labour market institutions may also be relevant for the unemployment gap between immigrants and 
natives. Employment protection legislation is potentially important as it affects the hiring and firing 
costs for employers. Arguably, strict employment protection makes employers screen job applicants 
more critically in order to spot potential low-productive workers (Gangl 2003; Giesecke and Groß 
2003; Kogan 2007). In the absence of perfect information on the productivity of workers, employers 
may give preference to job applicants from population subgroups that are assumed to have high 
average productivity potential. In this way, they apply ‘statistical discrimination’ against several 
groups including low educated, female workers, young people and immigrant job seekers (Phelps 
1972; Aigner and Cain 1977; Kogan 2006). This may increase unemployment duration for such 
workers. By contrast, employers in flexible labour markets are assumed to be more prone to use a 
‘trial and error’ strategy as screening device (Giesecke and Groß 2003) and hence immigrants leave 
unemployment easier. The effect of employment protection legislation has not been investigated in 
much detail as previous comparative studies have mainly focused on unemployment incidence instead 
of duration (Cohen and Kogan 2007; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Kogan 2006). However, the 
main finding of these studies is that the unemployment and inactivity gap between immigrants and 
natives increases with the strictness of employment protection legislation.  
Strict employment protection legislation may also account for a higher ethnic occupational 
segregation, with immigrants mainly occupying the poorer jobs in the secondary sector  (Doeringer 
and Piore 1971; Kogan 2007). There are however also other theoretical explanations for the higher 
concentration of immigrants in the secondary segment. Piore (1986) and Kogan (2007) suggest that 
this is also due to less native competition and lower appreciation of human capital in the secondary 
labour market. The acceptance of poor jobs by immigrants is believed to be caused by their ignorance 
of labour market conditions of the host country, their expectation of a temporary stay in Europe 
(Bonacich 1972) and the even poorer average quality of jobs in their home countries (MacKenzie and 
Forde 2009). Following this reasoning, we expect quicker transitions of immigrants in the secondary 
sector of the labour market in countries with a large low-skilled sector.  
 Immigration policy  
A further institutional feature often argued to influence the labour market integration of immigrants is 
the immigration policy of the host country (Kogan 2003; Lewin-Epstein, Semyonov et al. 2003). This 
influence is indirect as immigration policy may affect the skills’ composition (Borjas 1987) and health 
status among the immigrant population (Ekberg 1990). If immigration policy is strict and tailored to 
meet labour market needs, immigrants are assumed to be selected according to their skills and 
therefore easier to integrate into the labour market. However, if immigration policy is strongly 
affected by humanitarian considerations giving preference to refugees, or if it is more lenient, 
immigrants are more likely to be ‘negatively selected’ as seen from a labour market perspective and 
their labour market integration will be more difficult (Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1999). Perhaps most 
importantly, in the case of a humanitarian-focused immigration policy, the immigrant population will 
contain more individuals with mental and physical problems and hence more problematic perspectives 
for labour market integration. Furthermore, asylum seekers and refugees very often come from 
countries from which the transferability of skills – educational attainment, labour market experience, 
and language – to a European context is rather difficult. It is therefore often expected that the more 
lenient, or the more determined by humanitarian considerations, the policy of immigration is, the 
larger the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives becomes.  
 Summing up the main hypotheses which will be tested by our empirical analysis we first of all 
pose two conflicting hypotheses about the effect of benefits. It is expected from the job search theory 
that (generous) benefits generally increase unemployment duration and that the effect might be 
strongest for immigrants (hypothesis 1). However, according to alternative theories we expect the 
disincentives effects of granting benefits to immigrants to be offset by efficiency gains (hypothesis 2). 
Secondly, we expect strict employment protection legislation to lead to longer duration of 
unemployment for immigrants than for natives, increased occupational segregation and inactivity gap 
between immigrants and natives (hypothesis 3). Thirdly, we expect the unemployment-duration gap to 
be smaller when the demand for low skilled labour is high (hypothesis 4). Finally, we expect 
 immigrants to experience longer duration of unemployment and to be more likely to exit from the 
labour market when immigration policy is determined by humanitarian considerations (hypothesis 5).     
3. Data and Methodology 
Data 
Our data come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) which is a standardized 
longitudinal household survey conducted in 15 European countries (EUROSTAT 2003). The ECHP 
consists of 8 waves corresponding to the period 1994 to 2001. The data provides extensive 
information on labour market status, job and demographic characteristics. Especially for labour 
market status the ECHP offers retrospective monthly information for every year prior to the survey. 
This makes it particularly suitable for event-history analysis.  
The analysis focuses on unemployed individuals from 18 to 65 years.
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 Eleven out of the 15 
ECHP countries are used in our analysis as we had to exclude Luxembourg, the UK, the Netherlands 
and Sweden due to data limitations. After excluding the left-censored unemployment spells, our 
sample includes 31,307 spells of which 1,023 are non-EU immigrants. 
The definition of immigrant status is based on country of birth rather than on citizenship. The 
chosen definition is more comparable across countries since citizenship legislation differs 
considerably between European countries (Peracchi and Depalo 2006). More specifically, we have 
selected the immigrants coming from non-EU countries and excluded the immigrants from other EU 
countries. For 9 out of the 11 countries we use the variable pm007c that distinguishes between those 
being born in the country of residence, or in a non-EU country. In the case of Germany and Greece 
the variable pm007c was not available and the immigrant status is derived from other variables 
referring to citizenship, mother tongue and immigration trajectory.
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The variable referring to the receipt of unemployment benefit is crucial for our analysis. In fact, 
we extend the approach of Tatsiramos (2009) and we derive a variable representing the replacement 
rate.
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 As ECHP does not provide direct monthly information on the receipt of unemployment benefits, 
 we had to derive this information from the yearly amount of benefits (variable pi131), from the 
number of months in unemployment and from whether the individual receives benefits at the time of 
the survey (variable ps009). If the unemployed individual does not receive any benefits the 
replacement rate is set to 0.   
The following three macro-level variables are used: the index for Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL), the size of the low-skilled labour market and an index for the strictness of 
immigration policy. The EPL index is based on the level of hiring and firing regulations and the 
easiness of using temporary contracts (OECDa). The size of the low-skilled labour market is a self-
constructed variable measuring the percentage of workers employed in the secondary sector. More 
specifically, following Kogan (2006; 2007), we use the ISEI occupational scale and we set the 
threshold of the secondary sector to number 33 of this scale.
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 This threshold is also used in the 
definition of the destination states in our analysis, i.e. primary and secondary labour market. Finally, 
following Kogan (2006) we use the percentage of asylum seekers out of the total number of non-EU 
immigrants as a macro-level proxy for the strictness and focus of immigration policy. No other more 
precise indicator for immigration policy is available.  
The list of control variables includes measures for human capital, health status and demographic 
characteristics of the individuals as well as country dummies and regional unemployment rate
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.   
Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to study the gap in unemployment duration between immigrants and natives. 
Therefore, we employ an event-history model distinguishing between three competing risks: 
inactivity, primary and secondary labour market. After organizing our data in a person-month file, we 
apply a discrete-time event-history model by estimating a multinomial logit regression (Allison 1982). 
In this model, the dependent variable is the conditional probability that an individual  makes the 
transition into state in time point  conditional that she/he has remained in unemployment until 
time point  . This probability depends on a function of the duration of unemployment  - 
 duration dependence - and on several institutional and demographic characteristics. For the duration 
of unemployment (after testing several functions) we use the logarithmic specification that performed 
best. Furthermore we control for unobserved heterogeneity using a parametric approach.
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 By 
correcting for unobserved heterogeneity, we control for possible bias in duration dependence as well 
as possible correlation between competing risks (Vermunt 2002; Blossfeld, Golsch et al. 2007). The 
transition probability for an individual i to a competing risk m conditional of remaining t months in 
unemployment and of a vector of observed characteristics Xit is: 
 
In this formula,  represents the unobserved individual effects. It is time-constant and 
independent of the observed characteristics, but their effect varies per destination state . We further 
assume that  follows the standard normal distribution. 
4. Empirical findings 
Descriptive statistics 
Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, we perform some descriptive analysis to give an 
overview of the main associations with respect to our research questions. In Figure 1 we plot the 
correlation of the unemployment-duration ratios with our main variables of interest: average 
replacement rate of unemployment benefits (at country level), EPL, the size of the low-skilled labour 
force and the percentage of asylum seekers. A first important finding is that according to the 
immigrant-native gap in the duration of unemployment at the country level, the Scandinavian 
countries, Denmark and especially Finland, are no longer the poorest performers. Finland is 
outperforming even the Southern European countries.
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 This contrasts the findings of previous 
research that used unemployment incidence which suggested that the immigrant-native 
unemployment gap is the largest in Scandinavian countries. Combining our findings with the results 
of previous research, we conclude that although immigrants are probably much more frequently 
 unemployed than natives in Scandinavia, they experience much more persistent unemployment in 
some Continental European countries. 
 
‘FIGURE 1 here’ 
 
 The macro-level correlations show that the average replacement rate is not associated with the 
average unemployment duration. Thus, at the macro level, our descriptive statistics show no 
indication of a disincentive effect of benefits. On the contrary, the size of the secondary sector is 
strongly negatively correlated with the unemployment-duration gap while both EPL and the 
percentage of asylum seekers are positively correlated. Therefore, labour market institutions may have 
an ambiguous effect on the unemployment-duration gap between immigrants and natives. 
Specifically, the effect of the size of the low-skilled sector and the strictness of Employment 
Protection may well be cancelling each other out. In contrast, the effect of a humanitarian focused 
immigration policy has the expected negative effect on the immigrant’s employment opportunities. 
However, all 4 graphs indicate a possible existence of non-linearities in the relation between 
institutions and the unemployment-duration gap. This will be tested in our multivariate model.  
Kaplan Meier estimates 
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis we look at differences in the survival 
probability between immigrants and natives by means of the Kaplan Meier function. As shown in 
Figure 2, immigrants stay longer in unemployment before moving to any of the exit states (secondary 
labour market, primary labour market and inactivity). These immigrant-native differences are 
statistically significant according to the log-rank test. However, the graphs for the different exit states 
point to different interpretations.  If we look at the differences in survival estimates for exits to the 
primary and the secondary labour market there are clear signs of barriers for immigrant employment. 
More specifically, among those exiting into both the primary and the secondary labour market 75 % 
 of the natives are still unemployed after approximately one year, while around 85 % of the immigrants 
are in the same situation (see figure 2 below). The Kaplan Meier estimates for exits to inactivity tell 
us a different story. As evident from figure 2 immigrants stay longer in unemployment than natives 
before exiting into inactivity. This suggests that immigrants may be more committed job-seekers than 
natives.   
 
‘FIGURE 2 here’ 
 
Multivariate analysis 
As shown in previous section, there are considerable differences in the unemployment duration of 
immigrants and natives and our descriptive statistics support the idea that institutions indeed may be a 
cause thereof. We will now have a closer look to what extent these descriptive findings are supported 
by the results from the econometric model . In total, we estimated 3 different discrete-time survival 
models. In all models, the risk set consists of individuals being unemployed and the dependent 
variable is the probability of exiting unemployment to one of the exit states in month t conditional on 
having survived in unemployment until month t-1. The 3 models differ in the specification of the 
unemployment-benefit variable and in the sample used. More specifically, in Model 1 we include our 
full sample and the measure for unemployment benefit is a dummy indicating whether the individual 
receives benefits or not. Model 2 includes instead our measure for replacement rate, but the sample is 
restricted to 9 countries (we exclude France and Finland due to potential data problems).
12
 Model 3 
uses the same measure for replacement rate, but ignores the relevant data problem and uses all 11 
countries. 
 
 
 Estimates on the predictors  
Table 1 presents the results of Models 1-3. In this section, we focus our discussion on the effects of 
the main covariates of the models: the immigration dummy, the measures for unemployment benefits, 
the EPL, the size of the low-skilled labour force and immigration policy. The results of Model 1 
indicate that receiving unemployment benefits generally increases the likelihood of becoming 
employed in the secondary labour market for both natives and immigrants. However, unemployment 
benefits seem to be rather irrelevant for exits to the primary labour market as their effect is 
statistically significant, but very small. As far as exits to inactivity are concerned, receiving benefits 
decreases the likelihood of exiting to this state for both immigrants and natives. The difference in the 
effect between immigrants and natives is not statistically significant. The findings on exits from 
unemployment to employment and in particular to the secondary labour market clearly contradict the 
considerations of job-search theory. However, cross-country differences in the generosity of benefits 
may be relevant here. This is why we now turn to the results from model 2 and 3 where the level of 
the replacement rate is used instead of the dummy for receiving unemployment benefits. 
 
‘TABLE 1 here’ 
 
The results from the two models which include the replacement rate (model 2 and 3) are 
remarkably similar, which indicates that the problem with the robustness of the replacement rates for 
France and Finland does not bias our analysis. Some interesting differences between natives and 
immigrants emerge in the effect of the replacement rate. For natives, the replacement rate increases 
the likelihood of exiting to the secondary labour market. This effect is U-shaped as it is higher for the 
lowest and the highest replacement rates. In contrast, for immigrants this effect has an inverse-U 
shape as it is almost zero – slightly negative actually – at the low and high replacement rates and 
positive for medium-level replacement rates. This is an indication of possible disincentives effects of 
 granting the most generous benefits to immigrants when exiting into the secondary labour market. To 
investigate the size of these disincentive effects we calculated the predicted hazard of leaving 
unemployment for immigrants who receive no benefits and for those receiving the highest level of 
benefits at 6, 12, 18 and 24 months of unemployment duration (see table 2). We discover here that the 
differences in the predicted hazard of leaving unemployment to the secondary labour market between 
immigrants receiving no benefits and those receiving the highest level of benefits are neither 
substantial nor statistically significant. For natives, however, we see that those who receive the 
highest level of benefits are in fact leaving unemployment faster than the natives receiving no benefits 
and the difference is generally statistically significant. Therefore, the immigrant-native difference that 
emerged probably is produced by the positive effect of receiving the highest level of benefits for 
natives – an effect which does not exist for immigrants. However, as no difference in the predicted 
hazard for immigrants receiving no benefits and the highest level of benefits emerges, we can 
conclude that the disincentives effects for immigrants are not substantial.   
 
‘TABLE 2 here’ 
  
As far as the effect of replacement rate on the likelihood of exiting to the primary labour 
market is concerned, it remains U-shaped for natives. However, this effect becomes negative for the 
mid-level replacement rates. The effect of benefits on transitions into the primary labour market is not 
significantly different for immigrants and natives.    
 All-in-all, the results of our survival model using the more accurate replacement rate also 
clearly contradict the predictions of the job-search theory – especially in the case of exits to the 
secondary labour market – as there are no signs of substantial disincentives effects of benefits for 
either immigrants or natives. In all cases, individuals receiving unemployment benefits exit faster to 
the secondary labour market than individuals that are not covered by any unemployment protection 
 scheme. This might be due to less marginalization of the unemployed that receive benefits. In other 
words, the resource effect might here be stronger than the disincentives effects (Goul Andersen 2007).  
The results with respect to exits to the primary segment of the labour market do not indicate a 
negative and decreasing effect of the replacement rate either, as job-search theory would suggest.        
 The effect of the replacement rate on transitions to inactivity is fully in accordance with our 
theoretical considerations. The likelihood for such a transition decreases with the replacement rate. 
For natives, this effect is higher for the medium to high level replacement rates, while the effect for 
immigrants is much higher for low replacement rates. It seems that unemployment benefits create 
incentives for individuals to remain in active job search and not to withdraw from the labour market. 
Moreover, this mechanism appears to be more important for immigrants receiving low replacement 
rates.  
We will now turn to the results for our three macro variables. As the findings are similar for 
the three models, we present results jointly. For natives, an increase in the size of the low-skilled 
labour force increases the likelihood for exiting into inactivity in all three models and decreases the 
likelihood for exiting to the primary labour market in model 1.
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 In contrast, the likelihood for exiting 
to both segments of the labour market increases for immigrants. The effect of the low-skilled labour 
force is almost linear as the relevant quadratic terms are very small. Our findings suggest that natives, 
in labour markets with a large secondary sector, might be more prone to choose to exit from the 
labour market due to the difficulties of finding ‘appropriate’ jobs in the primary sector. However, 
immigrants seem to have better job chances when the secondary sector is large. These findings 
generally are in line with our theoretical expectations from the dual labour market theory.  
 Contrary to the size of the low-skilled labour force, the EPL generally has an insignificant 
effect for natives. For immigrants on the other hand the effect of EPL is significant. Specifically, the 
results indicate that as the Employment Protection Legislation becomes stricter, immigrants have 
increasing difficulties to exit to both the secondary and the primary labour market. This partly 
confirms our hypotheses. However, in contrast to our expectations, there is no indication that a stricter 
 EPL increases occupational segregation as there is not much difference in the effect of EPL between 
exits into the different segments of the labour market. Moreover, there is no significant evidence that 
a stricter EPL increases transitions to inactivity for immigrants.   
Finally, immigration policy is to some extent important for the employment opportunities of 
immigrants. More specifically, the higher the percentage of asylum seekers in a country is the lower 
the likelihood of an immigrant to exit to the secondary labour market. It is a bit surprising – 
considering our theoretical expectations – that the same is not the case for transitions into the primary 
labour market. This also contradicts the expectation that immigrants, in countries with a large share of 
asylum seekers, would be more likely to exit into inactivity. The small effect of the proportion of 
asylum seekers might be explained by the existence of more extensive integration measures in 
countries with a humanitarian focused immigration policy. This is also in line with the findings of 
Blos et. al (1997). Another possible explanation is that our measure for immigration policy is not 
completely robust. This suspicion emerges due to the surprising effects for the natives. More 
specifically, in models 2 and 3, both the likelihood for a transition to inactivity and to the primary 
labour market is decreasing with the percentage of asylum seekers.   
5. Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper, we investigated the effect of institutions on the gap in unemployment duration between 
immigrants and natives in 11 European countries using data from the European Community 
Household Panel. Specifically, we studied the effect of unemployment benefits, Employment 
Protection Legislation, the size of the low-skilled labour market and the focus of immigration policy. 
Contrary to most previous comparative studies, we modelled unemployment duration instead of 
unemployment incidence or aggregate unemployment rates. Moreover, as differences in 
unemployment exits between natives and immigrants may involve differences in the quality of jobs 
and differences in exits from the labour force (inactivity), we simultaneously studied exits to 
inactivity, the secondary and the primary labour market. Our modelling approach was a discrete-time 
survival model with the aforementioned 3 competing risks and a parametric control for unobserved 
 heterogeneity. Finally, while previous studies modelled effects of unemployment benefits at the 
country level, we modelled these effects at the individual level.  
 Our results clearly refute the widespread arguments about the disincentive effects of granting 
unemployment benefits to immigrants (hypothesis 1). Firstly, the ranking of European countries with 
respect to the immigrant-native unemployment gap changes considerably when we focus on the 
average unemployment duration instead of the aggregate unemployment rates. When focussing on 
unemployment duration, the countries with the most generous unemployment benefits, i.e. the 
Scandinavian countries, are no longer the poorest performers. Some continental European countries 
score a much larger gap than the Scandinavian countries. This suggests that the high unemployment 
rates of immigrants in Scandinavia are caused by frequent, but relatively short unemployment spells 
whereas the opposite is probably the case for Continental European countries.  
However, the most convincing evidence against the disincentive effects of benefits comes 
from our multivariate models. According to the results of these models, immigrants and natives that 
receive benefits with a replacement rate below 75% find a job in the secondary segment of the labour 
market faster than those that receive no benefits. At first glance, some disincentives effects of 
receiving the highest benefits for immigrants exiting into the secondary labour market seem to exist. 
However, the size of this effect is not substantial. The positive effect of benefits on the conditional 
job-finding probability holds also for exits to the primary segment for immigrants and natives that 
receive low replacement rates. A clear negative effect emerges only for exits to the primary segment 
for immigrants and with a replacement rate between 50-75 %. Nevertheless, instead of a disincentive 
effect, we argue that this may be interpreted as a stimulating effect of unemployment provision: 
immigrants with high skills and job motivation take advantage of the high replacement ratios and 
prolong their job search until they find a job that fits their skills and preferences. The overall positive 
effect of benefits on the labour market integration of immigrants is verified by their negative effect on 
transitions to inactivity. Immigrants receiving benefits are much less possible to become inactive than 
those receiving no benefits. We therefore generally find support for hypothesis 2, which stated that the 
disincentives effects of granting immigrants access to benefits are offset by efficiency gains. The main 
 reason for the fact that our results contradict the conclusions of previous research is most likely that 
we measure the effects of benefits at the individual level and not at the aggregate welfare regime 
level. Therefore, the effect found by other studies using welfare regime dummies are driven probably 
by differences in wage structure or culture rather than differences in work incentives.     
 Several differences emerge in the effect of labour market characteristics on the employment 
possibilities of natives and immigrants. In accordance to our expectations, the immigrant-native gap 
decreases with the demand for labour skilled labour (hypothesis 4). More specifically, for immigrants, 
the (conditional) job-finding probability in both segments of the labour market increases with the 
demand for low-skilled labour. It seems, therefore, that the demand for low-skilled labour not only 
increases the employment chances of immigrants in the secondary sector, but it also introduces spill-
over effects of this phenomenon by increasing their employability in the primary sector. 
 The results regarding the effects of employment protection legislation are partly in accordance 
with our expectations stated in hypothesis 3. Strict employment protection decreases the (conditional) 
job-finding probability in both sectors of the labour market. The immigrant-native gap in 
unemployment duration is increasing with EPL, which suggests that statistical discrimination towards 
immigrants may be at stake when employment protection is strict. However, we find no evidence that 
support the assumption that strict employment protection increases ethnical job-segregation nor do we 
find that the inactivity gap between immigrants and natives are increasing.    
 As far as immigration policy is concerned, immigrants have better employment performance 
in countries where immigration is labour-market oriented rather than humanitarian-oriented 
(hypothesis 5). However, the effect of immigration policy is minor also indicating that a humanitarian 
focused immigration policy may go ‘hand in hand’ with a sound labour integration of the immigrants.  
 All in all, our results question the effectiveness of labour market integration policies based on 
assumptions of employment disincentives and moral hazard among immigrants. Generous social 
protection can even be beneficial for immigrant employment as it prevents immigrants from becoming 
marginalised and moving further away from the labour market. However, it might be beneficiary to 
 accompany such an approach with policies tackling (statistical) discrimination, while facilitating 
degree-recognition programs and special schooling for immigrants. Further research, with richer, but 
currently unavailable datasets on immigrants can shed more light into these issues.  
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 1 
The only exception is one of the analyses in Kogan (2007). Here Kogan analyses differences in transitions in 
and out of unemployment between immigrants and natives in the UK and in Germany.      
2 
The reservation wage refers to the lowest wage for which the individual is willing to work (Borjas 2005).   
3 
Many European countries have in practise – despite formal legislation – have approached flat rate benefits. 
4 
This argument has been very popular in the political debate in some countries. The former Employment 
Minister of Denmark, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, argued that: ‘That it [the poor labour market integration of 
immigrants] to a great extent concerns culture (see e.g. Hjort Frederiksen 2007).
 
5 
Unemployed where the forwarded main activity is either full time or part time employed participation in 
employment related activities such as apprenticeship or training etc. or self-employment.  
6 
Variables pm008, pt025 and pm001, respectively.
 
7 
Monthly unemployment related benefits relative to previous wage.  
8 
The ISEI scale is an international standardized measure for occupational status developed by Ganzeboom. The 
occupations assigned the scores from 16 to 33 on this scale are unskilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled 
occupations.
 
9 
Further details can be attained upon request.  
10 
The literature has suggested two approaches to correct for unobserved heterogeneity: a parametric approach 
and a non-parametric one. After comparing the two approaches using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), we apply a parametric approach assuming normal distribution of 
the individual unobserved effect.  
11 
The large difference in the unemployment gap between Finland and Denmark may be explained by the fact 
that the composition of the immigrant population is very different. A large part of immigrants in Denmark 
consists of asylum seekers or family reunified immigrants. In Finland on the other hand there is a relative large 
proportion, of the non-EU (in the period of reference) immigrants (more than 1/3) who comes from neighboring 
countries (Russia and Estonia in particular). These immigrants are likely to be labour migrants. As the journey is 
short they are also more likely to return to their home country in case they do not find a job.         
12 
The large difference in the unemployment gap between Finland and Denmark may be explained by the fact 
that the composition of the immigrant population is very different. A large part of immigrants in Denmark 
consists of asylum seekers or family reunified immigrants. In Finland on the other hand there is a relative large 
proportion, of the non-EU (in the period of reference) immigrants (more than 1/3) who comes from neighboring 
countries (Russia and Estonia in particular). These immigrants are likely to be labour migrants. As the journey is 
short they are also more likely to return to their home country in case they do not find a job.         
13
 The effect on the likelihood of exiting to inactivity, however, does not differ significantly between immigrants 
and natives. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. The association between average duration and the institutional variables 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Kaplan Meier survival estimates for the three exits from unemployment  
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 Table 1. Results of the competing risk duration model  
 
Model 1* 
  
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
   
  Inact.  Sec.  Prim.  Inact. Sec.  Prim.  Inact. Sec.  Prim.  
Intercept -7,613 
(0,924) 
-4,855 
(0,735) 
-1,185 
(0,607) 
-6,925 
(1,047) 
-21,965 
(0,800) 
13,721 
(0,669) 
-6,897 
(1,008) 
 -21,914 
(0,800) 
13,908 
(0,663) 
Cfactor: intercept -0,063 
(0,036) 
1,542 
(0,025) 
-1,375 
(0,025) 
 -0,070 
(0,036) 
1,545 
(0,025) 
-1,371 
(0,025) 
-0,067 
(0,036) 
1,545 
(0,025) 
-1,374 
(0,025) 
Non-EU 0,132 
(0,646) 
0,122 
(0,743) 
-0,472 
(0,569) 
0,167 
(0,601) 
-0,036 
(0,671) 
-0,444 
(0,554) 
 0,186 
(0,613) 
 -0,061 
(0,674) 
 -0,337 
(0,554) 
Age -0,033 
(0,011) 
0,063 
(0,012) 
0,116 
(0,011) 
 -0,034 
(0,011) 
0,062 
(0,012) 
0,115 
(0,011) 
 -0,034 
(0,011) 
 0,062 
(0,012) 
 0,115 
(0,011) 
Age2 0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,002 
(0,000) 
0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,002 
(0,000) 
 0,001 
(0,000) 
 -0,001 
(0,000) 
 -0,002 
(0,000) 
Female 0,492 
(0,062) 
-1,025 
(0,058) 
0,448 
(0,044) 
 0,493 
(0,062) 
-1,026 
(0,058) 
0,452 
(0,044) 
 0,492 
(0,062) 
 -1,023 
(0,058) 
 0,452 
(0,044) 
Children<12 years -0,078 
(0,093) 
0,060 
(0,051) 
-0,224 
(0,060) 
 -0,081 
(0,094) 
0,053 
(0,051) 
-0,225 
(0,060) 
 -0,077 
(0,094) 
 0,053 
(0,051) 
 -0,224 
(0,060) 
Married 0,046 
(0,083) 
0,294 
(0,057) 
0,419 
(0,059) 
0,055 
(0,083) 
0,293 
(0,057) 
0,434 
(0,059) 
 0,054 
(0,083) 
 0,296 
(0,057) 
 0,439 
(0,059) 
Female*children 0,629 
(0,099) 
-0,253 
(0,073) 
-0,205 
(0,072) 
 0,625 
(0,099) 
-0,250 
(0,073) 
-0,196 
(0,072) 
 0,628 
(0,099) 
 -0,250 
(0,072) 
 -0,202 
(0,072) 
Female*married 0,639 
(0,089) 
0,190 
(0,074) 
-0,493 
(0,069) 
 0,634 
(0,089) 
0,197 
(0,074) 
-0,511 
(0,069) 
0,630 
(0,089) 
 0,194 
(0,074) 
 -0,513 
(0,069) 
Medium edu. -0,247 
(0,041) 
-0,623 
(0,040) 
0,747 
(0,036) 
-0,233 
(0,041) 
-0,611 
(0,040) 
0,747 
(0,036) 
 -0,238 
(0,041) 
 -0,616 
(0,040) 
 0,754 
(0,036) 
High edu. -0,229 
(0,057) 
-1,745 
(0,076) 
1,550 
(0,045) 
-0,215 
(0,058) 
-1,733 
(0,075) 
1,550 
(0,046) 
 -0,226 
(0,058) 
 -0,737 
(0,075) 
 1,549 
(0,046) 
Poor health 0,278 
(0,058) 
-0,319 
(0,052) 
-0,289 
(0,050) 
 0,288 
(0,058) 
-0,313 
(0,051) 
-0,300 
(0,050) 
 0,273 
(0,058) 
 -0,316 
(0,052) 
 -0,292 
(0,050) 
Very poor health 0,972 
(0,066) 
-0,806 
(0,095) 
-0,875 
(0,099) 
 0,975 
(0,066) 
-0,789 
(0,094) 
-0,898 
(0,099) 
 0,970 
(0,067) 
 -0,793 
(0,095) 
 -0,886 
(0,100) 
Lnseqvar 0,213 
(0,017) 
-0,044 
(0,015) 
-0,009 
(0,015) 
 0,210 
(0,017) 
-0,041 
(0,015) 
-0,008 
(0,015) 
 0,218 
(0,018) 
 -0,041 
(0,015) 
 -0,006 
(0,015) 
Reg. unempl. Rate -0,001 
(0,004) 
-0,025 
(0,005) 
-0,081 
(0,004) 
 -0,0001 
(0,004) 
-0,026 
(0,005) 
-0,081 
(0,004) 
 -0,001 
(0,004) 
 -0,026 
(0,005) 
 -0,080 
(0,004) 
Finland 0,591 
(0,177) 
-0,025 
(0,157) 
0,541 
(0,120) 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
 0,585 
(0,177) 
 -0,021 
(0,156) 
 0,517 
(0,121) 
Denmark 1,091 
(0,207) 
0,642 
(0,182) 
0,075 
(0,149) 
1,038 
(0,195) 
0,654 
(0,163) 
-0,238 
(0,133) 
 1,060 
(0,208) 
 0,620 
(0,184) 
 0,043 
(0,150) 
Belgium 0,318 
(0,173) 
-0,312 
(0,163) 
-0,647 
(0,131) 
 0,837 
(0,139) 
-0,216 
(0,142) 
-0,576 
(0,112) 
 0,329 
(0,174) 
 -0,301 
(0,163) 
 -0,659 
(0,131) 
France -0,422 
(0,122) 
-0,088 
(0,112) 
0,131 
(0,087) 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
 -0,440 
(0,122) 
 -0,088 
(0,112) 
 0,090 
(0,087) 
Austria 0,849 
(0,207) 
0,234 
(0,173) 
0,042 
(0,146) 
0,389 
(0,138) 
0,258 
(0,127) 
-0,387 
(0,106) 
 0,845 
(0,207) 
 0,263 
(0,174) 
 0,052 
(0,146) 
Italy -0,098 
(0,175) 
-0,489 
(0,144) 
-0,935 
(0,120) 
 -0,556 
(0,146) 
-0,492 
(0,124) 
-1,220 
(0,105) 
 -0,134 
(0,175) 
 -0,492 
(0,144) 
 -0,974 
(0,120) 
Spain 0,055 
(0,138) 
0,299 
(0,124) 
0,022 
(0,102) 
 0,119 
(0,101) 
 0,345 
(0,089) 
-0,221 
(0,077) 
 0,040 
(0,138) 
 0,300 
(0,125) 
 -0,009 
(0,103) 
Portugal -0,687 
(0,379) 
0,036 
(0,284) 
-1,050 
(0,281) 
 -1,274 
(0,357) 
0,011 
(0,268) 
-1,403 
(0,268) 
 -0,715 
(0,379) 
 0,022 
(0,284) 
 -1,066 
(0,281) 
Greece -0,332 
(0,216) 
-0,287 
(0,177) 
-1,022 
(0,150) 
-0,903 
(0,175) 
-0,342 
(0,150) 
-1,423 
(0,128) 
 -0,385 
(0,217) 
 -0,334 
(0,178) 
 -1,085 
(0,150) 
Ireland  0,778 
(0,434) 
0,639 
(0,347) 
0,036 
(0,296) 
 -0,385 
(0,324) 
0,586 
(0,266) 
-0,814 
(0,224) 
 0,756 
(0,433) 
 0,659 
(0,348) 
 0,018 
(0,297) 
Repl. >0 & <25 %** … … …  -0,096 
(0,094) 
0,422 
(0,064) 
 0,383 
(0,061) 
 -0,099 
(0,095) 
 0,422 
(0,064) 
 0,370 
(0,061) 
Repl. >25% & <50% … … …  -0,591 
(0,072) 
0,121 
(0,049) 
-0,020 
(0,047) 
 -0,606 
(0,072) 
 0,121 
(0,049) 
 -0,026 
(0,047) 
Repl. >50% & <75% … … …  -0,540 
(0,064) 
0,178 
(0,046) 
-0,101 
(0,045) 
 -0,549 
(0,065) 
 0,175 
(0,046) 
 -0,100 
(0,045) 
Repl. >75 % … … …  -0,379 
(0,061) 
0,332 
(0,046) 
0,158 
(0,044) 
 -0,386 
(0,061) 
 0,321 
(0,046) 
 0,157 
(0,044) 
Non-EU*repl.>0 
&<25% 
… 
 
… …  -1,540 
(0,725) 
-0,597 
(0,379) 
-0,119 
(0,291) 
-1,526 
(0,725) 
 -0,600 
(0,378) 
 -0,110 
(0,293) 
Non-EU*repl.>75 % … … …  -0,178  -0,604  -0,275  -0,161  -0,597  -0,291 
 (0,241) (0,235) (0,194) (0,240) (0,235) (0,194) 
Benefits  -0,452 
(0,046) 
0,248 
(0,035) 
0,070 
(0,034) 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
Non-EU*benefits -0,106 
(0,197) 
-0,400 
(0,191) 
-0,068 
(0,160) 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
EPL  -0,553 
(0,509) 
0,729 
(0,406) 
-0,611 
(0,354) 
-0,867 
(0,534) 
0,731 
(0,403) 
-0,814 
(0,356) 
 -0,551 
(0,508) 
 0,765 
(0,407) 
 -0,619 
(0,355) 
EPL2 0,206 
(0,092) 
-0,113 
(0,073) 
0,163 
(0,065) 
 0,235 
(0,096) 
 -0,116 
(0,073) 
 0,170 
(0,065) 
 0,206 
(0,092) 
 -0,120 
(0,073) 
 0,165 
(0,065) 
Non-EU*EPL  -0,077 
(0,182) 
-0,406 
(0,200) 
-0,381 
(0,168) 
-0,076 
(0,185) 
-0,386 
(0,193) 
-0,418 
(0,171) 
 -0,093 
(0,182) 
 -0,395 
(0,193) 
 -0,402 
(0,173) 
Size of sec. lab.  0,073 
(0,029) 
0,028 
(0,022) 
-0,037 
(0,019) 
 0,136 
(0,023) 
0,035 
(0,018) 
0,009 
(0,015) 
 0,075 
(0,029) 
 0,028 
(0,022) 
 -0,035 
(0,019) 
Size of sec. lab.2 -0,002 
(0,001) 
-0,001 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
 -0,003 
(0,001) 
-0,001 
(0,001) 
-0,000 
(0,001) 
 -0,002 
(0,001) 
 -0,001 
(0,001) 
 0,001 
(0,001) 
Non-EU*size  -0,055 
(0,050) 
 0,175 
(0,062) 
0,122 
(0,044) 
 -0,053 
(0,051) 
 0,169 
(0,060) 
 0,124 
(0,044) 
 -0,049 
(0,050) 
 0,172 
(0,061) 
0,113 
(0,045) 
Non-EU*size2  0,002 
(0,001) 
 -0,004 
(0,002) 
 -0,001 
(0,001) 
 0,002 
(0,001) 
 -0,004 
(0,002) 
-0,001 
(0,001) 
 0,002 
(0,001) 
 -0,004 
(0,002) 
 -0,001 
(0,001) 
% of asylum seekers  0,033 
(0,058) 
-0,007 
(0,043) 
-0,005 
(0,037) 
-0,180 
(0,042) 
-0,027 
(0,034) 
-0,062 
(0,028) 
0,030 
(0,058) 
 -0,008 
(0,043) 
 -0,003 
(0,037) 
Non-EU*asylum 
seekers 
 0,111 
(0,080) 
-0,215 
(0,092) 
 -0,117 
(0,072) 
 0,108 
(0,079) 
-0,203 
(0,091) 
 -0,109 
(0,073) 
 0,102 
(0,080) 
 -0,204 
(0,091) 
 -0,113 
(0,072) 
Note that whenever the coefficient for a variable is bold for one of the three exits the variable is overall significant at least the 5 % level. 
Furthermore if a coefficient is bold the variable in question is significantly (also at the 5 % level) effecting the transition into that particular 
exit state. The standard  errors are in brackets.  
*Model 1: includes all 11 countries and a dummy variables for whether benefits are received ; Model 2: France and Finland are not included 
and the more precise measure for benefits is included; Model 3: all countries are included as well as the more precise measure for benefits.    
**Repl. stands for ‘replacement rate’. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Predicted hazard for natives and immigrants receiving no benefits and more than 75 
% replacement rate at 6, 12, 18 and 24 months of unemployment duration 
  
6 months 
 
12 months 
 
18 months 
 
24 months 
No benefits     
Natives 0,0276 0,0211 0,0181 0,0160 
Immigrants 0,0187 0,0164 0,0154 0,0119 
 
75 % replacement rate 
    
Natives 0,0431 0,0304 0,0251 0,0234 
Immigrants 0,0205 0,0188 0,0161 0,0133 
 Note: The predicted hazards are estimated from model 3.  
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